Is Research in Motion (RIM) new licensing strategy a move for survival or a move toward dominance? If you have worked with RIM before, you know this new strategy is a major change from how they used to do business. Why that “sudden” change?

RIM has been a dominant player in wireless email for a while now. Their platform has been their success and strategy — their platform consists of proprietary handsets and software which are very good with secure wireless email and connectivity to back-end enterprise servers.

Up until now that strategy has worked well. But as competition intensifies and becomes fierce in all fronts, from handsets to software, RIM must adapt, and it has been adapting. RIM's handset competitors are now (finally) producing truly competitive devices such as the Nokia E61, the Motorola's Q, and other neat handsets such as the Sony Ericsson P990. On the software side there is Good, Visto, Seven, and Microsoft, to name a few, and they all provide the software infrastructure that enables
functionality similar to RIMs.

Up until recently, RIM's adaptation to market challenges have been in the form of new handsets and software which they have kept very closed and to themselves. Their handsets have come a long way since the original text-based pager-like, single-network BlackBerry — today RIM handsets support voice and GPS, Push-to-Talk, applications, OTA, and many wireless carriers. In addition, many enhancements have been made to the software, such as the transition to a pure Java client platform, they have their own developer tools (IDE), and have made significant enhancements to their gateway and server-software.

But what I believe has been RIM's most important change in strategy is the company's licensing of their technology – RIM is now licensing their technology as BlackBerry Connect, a strategy that begun around a year ago with a number of partnership annoucements. I believe that RIM has come to realize that with so much competition, and with the technology becoming commoditized, the next logical step is to take advantage of their unique position (popularity) and presence in the enterprise — licensing is what will help RIM maintain leadership in the secure wireless email space, in the enterprise.

If you haven't noticed, RIM has been creating relationships with all major handset players, ensuring that BlackBerry software runs on all major platforms and carriers: a relationship with Symbian to ensure BlackBerry Connect runs on Nokia and Sony Ericsson handsets, with HCT to ensure BlackBerry Connect runs on their Windows-based handsets, and now with Palm to ensure BlackBerry Connect runs on Treo handsets. Missing is support for Linux. Similarly RIM has signed BlackBerry Connect licensing deals with carriers such as Vodafone, Cingular and others.

RIM hasn't change their way of thinking, making their technology available to others, including competitors, out of the good of their hearts. They see licensing as an important strategic move. Hardware alone is not going to be the differentiator, it is the software, it is the presence in the enterprise, and the relationships and licenses. Purely depending on Blackberry handset sales, which today accounts for around 70 percent of their revenue, may be risky business over time – competitors will catch up sooner or later. But imagine if RIM becomes the provider of choice for the software that enables secure wireless email, both for the enterprise and for carriers – like the “Intel Inside” but for secure wireless email… that is huge. That is what they are doing.

The software platform licensing strategy is smart. The licensing strategy is really a long-term strategy that should (if well executed) help RIM maintain presence and leadership in the secure wireless email space.

Below is a quick and dirty list of some of RIM's BlackBerry Connect announcements over the past year:

Symbian, Nokia, Sony Ericsson:

Windows:

Palm:

Linux:

  • None, that I know of (10/17/05)

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