Archive for the ‘MobilityLandscape’ Category

Mobile Widgets – Mobease acquired by Webwag

Tuesday, March 27th, 2007


 

Congratulations to my friend Thomas Landspurg and the rest of his team on the acquisition of Mobease by Webwag.

Tom, their CTO, is a mobility expert, blogger, and mobile widget evangelist, visionary, and implementer; Tom is also the person behind J2MEMap, mobile games, and other. I share many of Tom's ideas, and I am glad to see him continue to move forward with his vision of mobile and integration through Widgets…

Webwag offers a pretty cool Web-based Widget-based portal, and if I had to guess, I bet they will be bringing Webwag to mobile via the integration with Mobease's Mobidget

Congrats Tom! Make it happen… Give us Mobile Widgets… Standardize… Have fun…

ceo

Microsoft to Acquire Tellme Networks

Saturday, March 17th, 2007


As reported all over the Web, Microsoft is acquiring TellMe Networks.

This is big news. TellMe has been a major player in the Voice (web) application space.

Microsoft is getting a company with the technology, IP, and experience in both mobile and voice, as very few companies out there have. Ironically, TellMe Mobile was first released as a Java ME application, but the same core technology will soon be applied to Windows Mobile.

Not long ago, I wrote a piece titled The Future of the Web and Mobile, where I emphasized the importance of voice in the future of mobility and the Web:


“So what is bigger than “local” applications space? The answer is Web/browser-based applications space. And what is bigger than Web/browser applications space? The answer is voice space.”

Microsoft has been very smart in understanding that Voice is and will be a key component in mobile applications… and this acquisition proves that. This acquisition also means that the doors are wide open for new companies wanting to fill in the new gap that has being created. Will TellMe be swallowed by the Blackhole called Microsoft, to become a Microsoft-only solution? Or will Microsoft allow TellMe free reign, keeping the TellMe platform available to others wanting to pay for it? Time will tell.

I won't be surprised if Google or even Yahoo! are or have been looking into this (Voice) space… and they should. They should consider acquiring Nuance, which is the “brains” behind many of the voice recognition solutions out there, including TellMe.

ceo

On Sybase/Mobile 365 and MySpace/UIEvolution

Wednesday, September 20th, 2006

Two recent (and relatively quiet) mobile industry news caught my attention:

Sybase/Mobile 365 – Sybase acquires Mobile 365. Mobile 365, a messaging infrastructure provider, will be operating as Sybase Mobile 365, a wholly-owned subsidiary. This will give Sybase an edge in mobile infrastructure, as Mobile 365 has in place the operators relationships, infrastructure, and customer base. I've used (integrated with) Mobile 365 in the past to provide server-side (text) message delivery.

MySpace/UIEvolution – MySpace has decided to go beyond MNVOs (Helio) and into the handset mainstream by making a deal with UIEvolution to develop MySpace Mobile. UIEvolution is the same company that created ESPN MNVO mobile experience. This deal will allow MySpace to maximize their customer reach. This is a smart move by MySpace, and congrats to UIEvolution for the win.

ceo

AdMob Gets Series A Funding

Wednesday, September 13th, 2006

Awesome… Congrats to the AdMob team, and Mike and Russell on their Round A of funding… very neat…

enrique

RIM Finally Settles with NTP – Was the Delay Worth the Risk?

Saturday, March 4th, 2006

BlackBerry Handset

The short answer is no. RIM should have settled much earlier… RIM management were irresponsible to their customers, putting them at risk, by putting the BlackBerry product-line at risk.

RIM's decision to delay the settlement comes to a price that goes beyond the $612.5 million they have put down for their “full and final settlement of all claims”. And these consequences include loss of potential subscribers, and having their existing customer base, as well as new potential customers, feel at risk and go explore alternatives from Good Technology to Microsoft's newest push email solution and others. For many customers, remaining “loyal” is in part due to the hassle and time it takes to investigate (and transition to) other technologies… And for many, they took this opportunity to learn about those other technologies. I even read the other day that while BlackBerry is #1, recent Treo sales have increased.

I am glad it is all over. It is time to move on…

ceo

U.S. Handset Penetration at 67%

Monday, February 27th, 2006

While doing some market analysis, and handset penetration numbers, I was surprised to see,
using CTIA subscriber numbers, that the handset penetration number here in the U.S. to be so high at 67%. Even if the numbers are a bit inflated, it is great to see such penetration, which translates to opportunities — and expect these numbers to get even better over time.

Figure-1 U.S. Population and Handset Subscribers (Feb 2006)


US penetration

Table-1 U.S. Population, Handset Subscribers and Penetration (Feb 2006)

Data Point Value
U.S. population (per
CIA.gov
)
295,734,134
U.S. Subscribers (per CTIA, Feb 2006) 204,111,067
7% Dual Handset Ownership (per M:Metrics) 14,287,774.69
Adjusted Dual Ownership to Individual Subscribers 7,143,887.35
Adjusted Individuals Subscribers 196,967,179.66

U.S. Handset Penetration
69% approx.

U.S. Handset Penetration (Adjusted)
67% approx.

*All numbers are approximate

ceo

MNVOs and The Demographic Problem

Tuesday, February 21st, 2006
early adopters

  1. 16.% "innovators" & "early adopters"

  2. 34% "early majority" or "pragmatists"

  3. 34% "late majority"
    or "conservatives"

  4. 16% "laggards"

MVNOs typically target specific demographic profiles. For example, Amp'd and Helio both target young people, Mobile ESPN targets sports fan, and Disney Mobile targets kids and their families.
Targeting a specific demographic profile enables focus, but not without risks. Focus vs. specialization is a tough question. Focus is always good. Specialization may or may not.

Specific demographic sets typically have their own
adoption curve
As I look at the different MVNO, I see that one of the challenges ahead of them
is how to deal with multiple demographics or a demographic profile within another demographic
profile… Let me explain.
In today's landscape, MVNOs target 1) early technology adopters who
also, 2) fall under another demographic profile. An example is Mobile ESPN,
whose target audience are early adopters who also are hard-core sports fan. To
succeed, the MVNO must have domain expertise in all the targeted demographic
profiles. Another concern related to demographic specialization is that MVNOs may also have non-compete clauses with the network operators that will
restrict the MVNO in the case of a change in strategy and/or change in target demographics…

(Are users of advanced mobile services (still) considered early adopters?
Yes, I think so. By advanced mobile services I mean services besides text and MMS messaging, ringtones and wallpapers, services such as access to the web, IM, video calls, location, and so on.)

The "early adopters" phase is defined to be temporal. But for how long will this phase last (for advanced mobile services)?
I am not sure — but
crossing the chasm
has taken years, and will take more years. Entering this
highly competitive landscape is a long-term investment effort, that requires deep pockets to stick around, to survive.

ceo

RIM's Own Medicine

Wednesday, November 30th, 2005

As we speak RIM is taking its own medicine… And it tastes so bad that it sucks. Not sure if you recall when RIM sued Hanspring and Good, and when RIM sued Glenayre, and who knows who else, for their patent on “method for pushing information from a host system to a mobile data communication device”… I remember reading their patent back in 2001-2002, and me thinking "this sucks, it is not fair" – because the IP covered typical networking and email stuff. More recently RIM sued Cranberry, a Cape Cod software company that named a program after the local cranberries. Maybe next they will sue anything that ends or sounds like “berry”, such as
Raspberries, Blueberries, Blackberries (of course) and even Crackberries. Whatever…The other day I wrote about Mobile e-Mail, Microsoft, Exchange, and Middleware and how it affects RIM, but I guess RIM has much worst short-term issues with NTP and related lawsuits. Pretty serious stuff…

ceo

On Mobile e-Mail, Microsoft, Exchange, and Middleware

Saturday, November 26th, 2005

[Updated on Nov. 28, 2005]

The other day News.com ran a story about RIM's CEO, Jim Balsillie, saying that “he is not worried about Microsoft's latest assault into his market space.”

My immediate reaction was, uh? Think again… that's not smart, especially if RIM depends so much on MSFT Exchange…

Then two days later, News.com ran another story about RIM revising their new subscriber numbers for the rest of the year after two new BlackBerry models failed to ship on time… The reported lower numbers may be
(this time) due to failure to ship handsets, but RIM's problem (and of any company that depends on Exchange
on the back-end) is called Microsoft.

Since Exchange now offers direct email access to mobile handsets, are the days of 3rd-party mobile email middleware to Exchange numbered? Read this.

The following should be available to any client that supports ActiveSync:

- Access to Exchange
- Exchange Direct Push Technology
- Global Address List (GAL) Lookup
- SecurID Two-factor Authentication to Exchange

The following probably are only available to Windows Mobile clients:

- Remote Wipe
- Device Password Policies

I wonder if the mobile email race on the enterprise will eventually shift mainly to the client side, since overtime (it seems) there
will be no need for middleware to Exchange, of course assuming 1) Exchange delivers its mobile access promises, and 2) client companies license ActiveSync, which they have been doing. It is all a matter of economics.

ceo


Updated in response to Carlo @ MobHappy (Nov 28, 2005):

There are two mobile email business markets: 1) mass, and 2) enterprise.

I totally agree with you with respect to #1. The mass email market is for those business people that don't necessarily use Exchange, but need business email over POP3, etc. In this market, carriers have the advantage, with the help of companies like Visto, Seven, etc.

With respect to #2 which is most of RIM's market, and which is dominated by Exchange, then Domino (these are the large enterprises), is where RIM must watch out. This is the market I was referring to on my post. To address this is why RIM has been licensing their technology like crazy .

I agree there is always room for improvement. I also agree the threat may not be immediate, but the threat is coming. At the same time, if we look at email, basic mobile email services are “good enough”. Imagine that Exchange get to offer push-email for real, and to global contacts, and secure connectivity, and my Nokia and other business phones have “native” support for ActiveSync. There is no need for 3rd party. No need to pay for 3rd party solutions. Please note that I have written and sold mobile email clients, and I can tell you, companies rather not have another middleware to maintain.

If you ask me today, I tend to think the killer mobile email solution is a purely client one, one that connects to the enterprise (and personal) – no or minimal middleware, etc.

Exchange is slowly but surely offering all the basic mobile email features; it is a matter of time before MSFT owns the mobility side of MSFT IT shops, again assuming handset vendors license and offer ActiveSync “natively”.

I would be concerned if I was an (enterprise-focused) mobile email middleware company.

Nokia to buy Intellisync

Wednesday, November 16th, 2005

Nokia to buy Intellisync. Interesting. A couple of years ago while at AGEA, I had business/partnership interactions with Pumatech, now Intellisync. Back then Pumatech swallowed Atlanta-based Synchrologic, another company I dealt with, who had a very neat/robust synchronization product — if I recall correctly this merge was a result of a patent infringement battle between the two. Pumatech then acquired the Motorola subsidiary Starfish Software, a SyncML pioneer. Those of you doing mobility a number of years ago should remember those companies, pioneers and innovators on data synchronization, all now under Intellisync. Since then Intellisync has acquired other companies in the email and VPN space. I just wanted to mentioned those other companies before they get forgotten, companies I believe made an impact in the development/evolution of mobile data sync. Congrats to the Intellisync folks…

[via MobileTracker]

ceo

The MSFT Strategy Memo Leak Shows Adaptability

Thursday, November 10th, 2005

Russell Buckley of Mobhappy wrote about Gate's leaked memo and a “Sea Change”.

I don't think MSFT is steering in the wrong direction, but instead I see adaptability to market conditions. I think the memo covers only one of MSFT's many “battlefronts” — the Internet-based software and services "battlefront". And this is because web-based software and services are central to the rest of MSFT (and other company's) products. The following list shows some of MSFT's “battlefronts” and the related products:

  • Internet-based software & services, search and advertising (Live products such as
    Windows Live and
    Office Live, Start),
  • Community (MSN, see above),
  • Mobility (Windows Mobile),
  • Media and gaming (Media Center and Xbox)

Not mentioned above are the business and tools areas, which also leverages the web services paradigm.

Internet-based software and services are key to the whole thing, to all products. And this market is way still too young to discount anyone yet, especially MSFT. And with respect to mobility and this strategy, it is about the combination of mobility + Web 2.0 (Mobility 2.0) – which goes back to why the services on the net are so important, whatever they are — search and maps as in the case of Google's new Local app. for mobile, or services to enhance communication between people.

I think Ray Ozzie,
who is a smart and open-minded person with a great track record, is going to make a huge impact on MSFT (it typically takes
the right leader with the right influence to steer a company in the right direction), more directly on Internet-based software and services, and more indirectly on the rest of the battlefronts such as mobility. We are seeing Ray's impact already, in
publicly recognizing the importance of web-based services and software in general,
and their competition and limitations, and reacting to this by steering a very large company, something that is very hard to do, to address this —
Gates seems to be listening/leveraging his evangelist/CTO, and it seems to me MSFT is moving faster on this strategy than what I have seen it do before.

So I believe the memo shows adaptability, or at least attempts to adapt… vs. the company doing the wrong thing — don't you agree?

You can find the “The Internet Services Disruption” memo by Ray Ozzie at Dave Winer's website.

ceo

RIM's Licensing Strategy – Why?

Tuesday, October 18th, 2005

Is Research in Motion (RIM) new licensing strategy a move for survival or a move toward dominance? If you have worked with RIM before, you know this new strategy is a major change from how they used to do business. Why that “sudden” change?

RIM has been a dominant player in wireless email for a while now. Their platform has been their success and strategy — their platform consists of proprietary handsets and software which are very good with secure wireless email and connectivity to back-end enterprise servers.

Up until now that strategy has worked well. But as competition intensifies and becomes fierce in all fronts, from handsets to software, RIM must adapt, and it has been adapting. RIM's handset competitors are now (finally) producing truly competitive devices such as the Nokia E61, the Motorola's Q, and other neat handsets such as the Sony Ericsson P990. On the software side there is Good, Visto, Seven, and Microsoft, to name a few, and they all provide the software infrastructure that enables
functionality similar to RIMs.

Up until recently, RIM's adaptation to market challenges have been in the form of new handsets and software which they have kept very closed and to themselves. Their handsets have come a long way since the original text-based pager-like, single-network BlackBerry — today RIM handsets support voice and GPS, Push-to-Talk, applications, OTA, and many wireless carriers. In addition, many enhancements have been made to the software, such as the transition to a pure Java client platform, they have their own developer tools (IDE), and have made significant enhancements to their gateway and server-software.

But what I believe has been RIM's most important change in strategy is the company's licensing of their technology – RIM is now licensing their technology as BlackBerry Connect, a strategy that begun around a year ago with a number of partnership annoucements. I believe that RIM has come to realize that with so much competition, and with the technology becoming commoditized, the next logical step is to take advantage of their unique position (popularity) and presence in the enterprise — licensing is what will help RIM maintain leadership in the secure wireless email space, in the enterprise.

If you haven't noticed, RIM has been creating relationships with all major handset players, ensuring that BlackBerry software runs on all major platforms and carriers: a relationship with Symbian to ensure BlackBerry Connect runs on Nokia and Sony Ericsson handsets, with HCT to ensure BlackBerry Connect runs on their Windows-based handsets, and now with Palm to ensure BlackBerry Connect runs on Treo handsets. Missing is support for Linux. Similarly RIM has signed BlackBerry Connect licensing deals with carriers such as Vodafone, Cingular and others.

RIM hasn't change their way of thinking, making their technology available to others, including competitors, out of the good of their hearts. They see licensing as an important strategic move. Hardware alone is not going to be the differentiator, it is the software, it is the presence in the enterprise, and the relationships and licenses. Purely depending on Blackberry handset sales, which today accounts for around 70 percent of their revenue, may be risky business over time – competitors will catch up sooner or later. But imagine if RIM becomes the provider of choice for the software that enables secure wireless email, both for the enterprise and for carriers – like the “Intel Inside” but for secure wireless email… that is huge. That is what they are doing.

The software platform licensing strategy is smart. The licensing strategy is really a long-term strategy that should (if well executed) help RIM maintain presence and leadership in the secure wireless email space.

Below is a quick and dirty list of some of RIM's BlackBerry Connect announcements over the past year:

Symbian, Nokia, Sony Ericsson:

Windows:

Palm:

Linux:

  • None, that I know of (10/17/05)

ceo